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NOTES AND COMMENT
NEW YORK MOTOR VEHICLE LAW; EFFECT ON ComiloN LAW LIA-
BILITY OF OWNER OF MOTOR VEEICLE.*-An interesting light is thrown
on Section 282e of the Highway Law" by the recent decision.2 In that
case the owner had lent his automobile to one, who, in turn, had lent it
to another, the first lendee not being in the car at the time it collided
with and damaged plaintiff's vehicle. The Court held that the owner was
not liable inasmuch as he had not consented either expressly or impliedly
that the lendee should turn the car over to another person. In distin-
quishing the case from Feitelberg v. Matuson, 3 the Court pointed this
out and remarked that in the latter case the borrower was actually in the
car when the accident occurred and had merely turned the wheel over
to another person.
It is interesting to note that neither of these actions would have
been maintainable against the owner of the automobile at common law.
The general rule, prior to statutory enactment, was that mere owner-
ship of an automobile did not render the owner liable for its negligent
operation by another.4 If an automobile was hired without a chauffeur
the owner was not responsible for the negligence of the borrower's
operator during the time it was hired. Although the title remained in
the owner, the hirer had the exclusive use of the thing hired during
the period of hire; and neither the owner nor the creditors of the owner
* See J. P. Chamberlain, "Automobiles and Vicarious Liability," Am.
B. A. J., Nov., 1924.
'L. 1924, ch. 534, as amended by L. 1925, ch. 167 and L. 1926, ch. 730,
in effect May 3, 1926. "Every owner of a motor vehicle operated upon a
public highway shall be liable and responsible for death or injuries to person
or property resulting from negligence in the operation of such motor vehicle,
in the business of such owner or otherwise, by any person legally using or
operating the same with the permission, express or implied, of such owner.
All bonds executed by or policies of insurance issued to the owner of a
motor vehicle shall contain a provision for indemnity or security against
the liability and responsibility provided in this section. If a motor vehicle
be sold under a contract of conditional sale whereby the title to such motor
vehicle remains in the vendor, such vendor or his assignee shall not be
deemed an owner within the provisions of this section, hut the vendee, or
his assignee shall be deemed such owner notwithstanding the terms of
such contract, until the vendor or his assignee shall retake possession of
such motor vehicle. A chattel mortgagee of a motor vehicle out of posses-
sion shall not be deemed an owner within the provisions of this section."
'Owen v. Gruntz, 216 App. Div. (N. Y.) 19 (1926).
" 124 Misc. (N. Y.) 595 (1925).
'Hartley v. Miller, 165 Mich. 115, 130 N. W. 336 (1911); Hartnett v.
Gryzmish, 218 Mass. 258, 105 N. E. 988 (1914) ; Provo v. Conrad, 130 Minn.
412, 153 N. 1V. 753 (1915) ; Riley v. Roach, 168 Mich. 294, 134 N. W. 14
(1912) ; Reilly v. Connable, 214 N. Y. 586, 108 N. E. 853 (1915) ; Steffen v.
McNaughton, 142 Wis. 49 (1910), 26 L. R. A. 382; Danforth v. Fisher, 75
N. H. 111, 71 A. & L. 535 (198).
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had any right to disturb him in the lawful enjoyment of it during that
time. The hirer was, in effect, an independent contractor, whose acts
were not to be attributed to the owner.5 A gratuitous bailment came
within the same general rule, and by completely relinquishing control
an owner could escape liability for the negligent acts of the bailee.6
Again, so far as the rule of "respondeat superior" was concerned, the
fact that the car was being driven by an employe did not fasten liability
conclusively on the master unless it could be shown that such employe
was acting within the general scope of his authorized employment at
the time the act of negligence was committed.7
The effect of the Highway Law, supra, has not yet so permeated
these rules that it can be said to have abrogated them, though the few
cases in the reports indicate an important change in the law. In
Brooks v. McNutt,8 the defendant had leased a car on April 28 to
Turner, a stranger. The car, according to the testimony of defendant's
witnesses, was to be returned next day. Turner, while recklessly driving
5 Smith v. Niles, 20 Vt. 315, 49 Am. Dec. 782 (1848) ; Bosco v. Boston
Store of Michago, 195 Ill. App. 133 (1915) ; Gall v. Detroit, 191 Mich. 405,
158 N. W. 36 (1916); Woodcock v. Sartle, 84 Misc. (N. Y.) 488, 146 N. Y.
Supp. 540 (1914) ; Story on Bailments, Sec. 395; 5 Cyc. 213.
'Kennedy v. R. & L. Co., 224 Mass. 207, 112 N. E. 872 (1916); Eberle
v. Briscoe Motor Co., 194 Mich. 140, 160 N. W. 440 (1916); Doran v.
Thomson, 74 N. J. L. 445, 66 At. 897 (1907); Stenzler v. Standard Gas,
179 App. Div. 774, 167 N. Y. Supp. 282 (1917); Limbacher v. Fannon, 102
Misc. 703, 169 N. Y. Supp. 490 (1918); Kitz v. Scudder, 199 Ill. App. 605
(1916); Premier Motor v. Tilford, 61 Ind. App. 164, 111 N. E. 645 (1915);
Cunningham v. Castle, 127 App. Div. 580, 111 N. Y. Supp. 1057 (1908);
Reilly v. Connable, 214 N. Y. 586, 108 N. E. 853 (1915); Dunmore v. Pad-
den, 262 Pa. 436, 105 At. 559 (1918) ; "The law, however, contains no pro-
hibition against the owner of an automobile loaning it to his chauffeur or
anyone else for any lawful purpose, and he is not liable for damages caused
thereby when in the use by his consent on the business or pleasure of
others." Bogorad v. Dix, 176 App. Div. 774, 162 N. Y. Supp. 992 (1917).
18 R. C. L. 804, and cases therein cited; Potts v. Pardee, 220 N. Y.
431, 116 N. E. 78 (1917); Rolfe v. Hewitt, 227 N. Y. 486, 125 N. E. 804
(1920) ; Fleischner v. Durgin, 207 Mass. 435, 93 N. E. 801 (1911) ; Hartnett
v. Gryzmish, 218 Mass. 258, 105-N. E. 988 (1914); Orr v. Thompson Coal
Co., 219 Ill. App. 116 (1920); Durham v. Strauss, 38 Pa. Super Ct. 620
(1909); Gewanski v. Ellsworth, 166 Wis. 250, 164 N. W. 996 (1917); White
Oak Coal Co. v. Rivoux, 88 Ohio 18, 102 N. E. 302 (1913); Pease v. Mont-
gomery, 111 Me. 582, 88 Atl. 973 (1913) ; Adams v. Weisendanger, 27 Cal.
App. 590, 150 Pac. 1016 (1915). "It is elementary that the master is not
liable for injuries occasioned to a third person by the negligence of his
servant, while the latter is engaged in some act beyond the scope of his
employment, although he may he using the instrumentalities furnished him
by the master with which to perform the ordinary duties of his employment."
Slater v. Advance Thresher Co., 97 Minn. 305, 107 N. W. 133 (1906).
'126 Misc. (N. Y.) 730 (1926).
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the car on May 1, injured plaintiff. The vehicle was found later aban-
doned and was re-delivered to the defendant by the police. The Court said,
"In the absence of any statutory provision, the defendant having divested
itself of control of the car and turned over control to someone else, the
person in charge of the car would be solely liable for any damages caused
by negligence." In its opinion the Motor Vehicle Law, supra, furnished
the necessary provision; for, disregarding the fact that Turner was an
independent bailee for hire over whose acts defendant had absolutely no
control, the Court held it liable. In line with this decision is Stapleton
v. Independent, 9 a Michigan case, which was decided under a statute
similar to the local one.' 0 The bailee, in that case, was a corporation,
and in holding the owner liable, the Court decided that a bailor for hire
could be liable for the acts of the servant of an independent bailee.
The reported cases since the enactment of the Michigan and New
York statutes, supra, do not appear to have touched on the change, if
any, in the liability of an owner of a motor vehicle for the negligent acts
of his chauffeur. The common law rule is that a material deviation from
the line of duty by a servant is sufficient to relieve the master from
liability for his acts,"' and the same rule applies where the servant
operates the car contrary to the strict orders of the owner that it shall
not be operated at certain times or for other than designated persons.' 2
But in Plaumbo v. Ryan, 3 the Court held that the object of the statute
was to provide that the owner should be liable if the third person was
using the automobile with his consent and to prevent the owner from
escaping liability by saying that his car was being used at the time
and place of the accident without specific authority or not in his busi-
ness. In Michigan, Hatter v. Dodge,' 4 stands for a similar proposition,
and if such is the settled law it would appear that modern legislatures
'198 Mich. 174, 164 N. W. 520 (1917).
Michigan Public Acts, 1925, No. 287 amending Michigan Public Acts,
1915, No. 302, Sec. 29.
' Cronecker v. Hall, 92 N. J. L. 450, 195 At. 213 (1918); Solomon v.
Commonwealth Trust, 256 Pa. 55, 100 Ati. 534 (1917); Youngquist v. L. J.
Droese Co. (Wis.) 167 N. W. 736 (1918); Fleischner v. Durgin, 207 Mass.
435, 93 N. E. 801 (1911). "A plaintiff cannot recover where the chauffeur
was not upon the defendant's business or acting within the scope of his
employment but was going away from his work and in an opposite direction
for a purpose of his own and on an errand for a friend." O'Brien v. Stern
Bros., 223 N. Y. 290, 119 N. E. 550 (1918).
12 Sultzbach v. Smith, 174 Iowa 704, 156 N. XV. 673 (1916); Linville v.
Nissen, 162 N. Car. 95, 77 S. E. 1096 (1913).
"213 App. Div. (N. Y.) 517 (1926).
14 "Aside from this, as the law now stands (under the statute-ed.) it is
not a prerequisite for recovery to prove that the motor vehicle causing
an injury was being operated in the business of the owner, for his use and
enjoyment, or by his servant or employe." 202 Mich. 97 (1918).
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have gone Lord Holt, the propounder of the doctrine of "respondeat
superior,"'15 one better by holding that a master is liable for the acts
of his servant as long as the latter has possession of the machine with
the former's consent.
The New York Motor Vehicle Law, supra, fastens liability on the
owner of an automobile only where his consent to driving the car,
either express or implied'16 has been given to the operator. Reverting
to Owen v. Gruntz,' 7 it is clear that if the defendant had given only
the bailee, a gratuitous one, consent to operate the vehicle, such consent
could not be stretched by implication to *cover any other person who
did not exist in the contemplation of the owner. In contradistinction,
Feitelberg v. Matuson, supra, was a case where the borrower was in
the car and was merely permitting another person to operate it when
the accident occurred. Control was still in the bailee though the min-
isterial act of operation was in another, and the owner's consent im-
pliedly carried with it the permission to the bailee to use his own chauf-
feur or other person to perform the mechanical act of operation. If
the latter decision is correct it may be argued from anology that a
similar result should follow where a servant remains in the automobile
but turns the wheel over to a third person. As the servant is master
"ad hoe" of the vehicle it may be said with some truth that he may
do anything which the master could do with respect to its operation.
Hence if he relinquishes the mechanical act of operation it would be
equivalent to the master's act. But if this should be the law then cer-
tainly the old rule holding the master liable only where he has given
the servant express or implied authorization to do so 's has been dis-
carded. If the servant should leave the car entirely after relinquishing
control to another, however, then the common law rule above stated
would probably yet apply, inasmuch as there has been such a substitu-
tion of servants as even the statute cannot overcome. The rule is
well settled that there cannot be a substitution of either master or
servant without the consent of both.xO
"Vicarious Liability (T. Baty, p. 151); Brucker v. Fromont, 6 T. R.
659; Bosori v. Sandford, 2 Salk. 440 (1689); Labatt's Master and Servant,
(2d ed.) p. 6727; "For all acts done by a servant in obedience to the express
orders or direction of the master, or in the execution of the master's busi-
ness, within the scope of his employment, and for acts in any sense war-
ranted by the express or implied authority conferred upon him, considering
the nature of the services required, the instructions given and the circum-
stances under which the act is done, the master is responsible." Ritchie
v. Waller, 63 Conn. 160, 28 AtI. 29, 27 L. R. A. 161, citing (1893) Stone v.
Hills, 45 Conn. 47 (1877).
'6 Supra, note 1.
"Supra, note 2.
'Wooding v. Thorn, 148 App. Div. (N. Y.) 21 (1911).
"Cleveland, etc. R. Co. v. Berry, 152 Ind. 607, 53 N. E. 415 (1899);
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Authority for the action of the Legislatures in this State and in
Michigan rests in the police power inherent with the State.20 In Ten-
nessee, 21 South Carolina,22 and Connecticut, 2 statutes have been passed
and held valid which made damages due to injuries received from negli-
gent or illegal driving a lien on the vehicle, irrespective of who was
driving the car as long as the operator had the consent of the owner
to do so. The first Michigan statute 24 on the point was declared un-
constitutional so far as it attempted to impose liability where a tres-
passer obtained possession of the machine without the owner's fault
inasmuch as such liability was in violation of the "due process" clause
of the Federal and State Constitutions.2 5 This error was remediedt
by the subsequent enactment.
2 6
A motor vehicle, has been judicially declared not to be a nuisance; 27
other Courts have held that they are not dangerous machines "per
se" although under certain conditions and circumstances they may be-
come such;28 and no Court has gone so far as to hold that the theory
Roddy v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 104 Mo. 234, 15 S. W. 1112 (1891); Hanna
v. Chattanooga, etc. R. Co., 88 Tenn. 310, 12 S. W. 718 (1889); Miller v.
Moran Bros. Co., 39 Wash. 631, 81 Pac. 1089 (1905); Rhodes v. Georgia
R. etc. Co., 84 Ga. 320, 10 S. E. 922 (1889).
" Feitelberg v. Matuson, 124 Misc. (N. Y.) 595 (at p. 597) (1925)
Stapleton v. Independent, 198 Mich. 174, 164 N. W. 520 (1917); Merchants'
v. Brigman, 106 S. Car. 362, 91 S. E. 321 (1916); Core v. Resha, 140 1T'enn.
408, 204 S. W. 1149 (1917).
Chap. 173, Sec. 5, L. 1905; Constitutionality upheld in Core v. Resha,
140 Tenn. 408, 204 S. W. 1149 (1917).
22 Act. 1915 (27 St. at Large, p. 737) ; Constitutionality upheld in Mer-
chants' v. Brigman, 106 S. Car. 362, 91 S. E. 332 (1916).
2' General Statutes, Sec. 1572; Constitutionality upheld in Wolf v. Sulik,
93 Conn. 431, 106 Atl. 443 (1919).
"
4Michigan Public Acts, 1909, No. 318.
'Daugherty v. Thomas, 174 Mich. 371, 140 N. W. 615, 45 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 699, Ann. Cases 1915 A. 1163 (1913).
26 Supra, note 7.
27Gaskins v. Hancock, 156 N. C. 56, 72 N. E. 80 (1911); Huddy Law of
Automobiles (7th ed.) p. 35.2 Linville v. Nissen, 162 N. Car. 95, 77 S. E. 1096 (1913) ; Hartley v.
Miller, 165 Mich. 115, 130 N. W. 336 (1911); Cunningham v. Castle, 127
App. Div. 580, 111 N. Y. Supp. 1057 (1908) ; McIntyre v. Orner, 166 Ind. 57,
76 N. E. 750 (1906); Jones v. Hoge, 47 Wash. 663, 92 Pac. 433 (1907).
"An automobile is not a 'dangerous instrumentality' in the sense in which
that term is used in the law; and the relation between the owner of a car
and his chauffeur is determined, in the absence of a statute, by the general
rules of law relative to master and servant." Brinkman v. Zuckerman, 192
Mich. 624, 159 N. W. 316 (1916).
"It is not the ferocity of the automobile that is to be feared, but the
ferocity of those who drive them. Until human agency interferes they are
usually harmless." Lewis v. Amorous, 3 Ga. App. 50, 59 S. E. 338 (1908).
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of daiigerous appliances applies in the case where an automobile is
hired to an independent contractor.2 9  Nevertheless, as was said in
Stapleton v. Independent,3 ° "If the owner of such agency (referring
to an automobile) consents to turn it over to the control of an in-
competent or reckless chauffeur he is not deprived of any legal right
in holding him liable for its negligent operation when in such con-
trol and a greater degree of safety to the general public is likely to
follow. * * * The owner of an automobile is supposed to know, and
should know, about the qualifications of the persons he allows to use
his car, to drive his auto, and if he has doubts of the competency or
Garefulness of the driver he should refuse to give his consent to the
use by him of the machine." It is this reasoning which has prompted
the several State Legislatures to enact the statutes which, in effect,
create "double-barrelled" liability against the owner besides the driver
in favor of an injured plaintiff.
L. L. W.
EXAMINATION BEFORE TRIAL.-Section 288 of the Civil Practice Act
provides in part that: "Any party to an action in a court of record may
cause to be taken by deposition, before trial, his own testimony or that
of another party which is material and necessary in the prosecution or
defense of an action." The section also goes on to say: "A party to such
an action may cause to be so taken the testimony, which is material and
necessary of the original owner of a claim which constitutes, or from
which arose, a cause of action acquired by an adverse party by grant,
conveyance, transfer, assignment or endorsement and which is set forth
in his pleading as a cause of action or counterclaim." * * *
This section substantially differs frrom the code of Civil Procedure
in that now all parties are subject to examinations, and makes it incum-
bent on the objector to apply to the court for an order to vacate the
notice of examination inasmuch as the purpose of this section is to re-
move all procedural trammels and permit examinations with. as few
restrictions as possible. It was necessary under the code, however, for
the moving party to prove circumstances which would authorize such
examination, the theory being that ordinarily parties were not subject
to examination.'
"9Burbank v. Bethel Steam, 75 Me. 373 (18-3); Whitney v. Clifford,
46 Wis. 138, 49 N. W. 835 (1879); Powell v. Virginia Const. Co., 88 Tenn.
692, 13 S. W. 691 (1890) ; Cunningham v. International, 51 Texas 503 (1879) ;
"The only obligation on the part of an employer in reference to tools or
appliances supplied is to exercise due care not to let the contractor have
an appliance which is a nuisance or is apparently defective or likely to cause
injury to third persons." 14 R. C. L. 84-85.
' Supra, note 6.
'200 App. Div. 206, 191 N. Y. Supp. 848 (2nd Dept. 1922).
